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Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) from China has become a popular topic in the 
academic literature because of its rapid increase and unconventional patterns (among many 
others, see Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Buckley et al, 2007). The rise of Chinese 
investments follows the provisions of the “Going Out” strategy, launched with the 10th 
Five-year Plan in 2000 and later reinforced in subsequent plans that fostered the 
internationalization of domestic firms. The aim was to promote industrialization and 
technological upgrading to support growth of the domestic economy (Gu and Reed, 2013). 
But so far there is only a limited amount of empirical research available regarding the effect 
of OFDI on the performance of Chinese investor companies. The related empirical 
literature has, in fact, mainly focused on analysing the drivers of internationalization and on 
location choices, at both country level (Buckley et al., 2007; Deng, 2009) and firm level 
(Amighini et al, 2013; Ramasamy et al, 2013). Some recent notable exceptions include a 
paper by Chen and Tang (2014) analysing the impact of Chinese OFDI on firms’ 
performance on the basis of data from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and another 
paper by Edamura et al (2014) that deals with the impacts of acquisitions and uses a 
Chinese-based financial database (ChinaVenture). 
In this paper, we investigate whether and how OFDI has a positive impact on the 
performance of Chinese investing companies, using a sample of 368 Chinese firms, each 
having an affiliate in Europe, and covering the period 2003-2011. The empirical analysis 
takes advantage of the availability of a new database, EMENDATA (see Amighini et al., 
2014, for a complete description), which merges FDI (both greenfield and M&A) 
information with firm financial data from Orbis Bureau van Dijk’s (BvD). 
We measure the impact of OFDI on the investing companies covering different dimensions 
of firms’ performance, including productivity, scale, sales, and profitability. In addition, we 
disaggregate OFDIs according to the mode of entry - Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) or 
greenfield investments - and we assess whether there is any difference in impact on 
investors. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study examining the impact of 
Chinese OFDI (a) into advanced economies and (b) accounting for specific effects of the 
different modes of entry.  
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Europe is an interesting destination because Chinese OFDI into EU countries is mainly 
motivated by the search of new markets, with the aim of creating overseas platforms for 
sales and distribution, and of strategic assets, aimed at acquiring foreign technologies, 
knowledge and brands that are not fully available at home (Amighini et al, 2013).  
Therefore, it is of particular interest to investigate whether these investments - by 
introducing more efficient production techniques and improving overall performance in 
terms of scale, sales and profitability – generate positive effects on the performance of the 
investing firms. 
We use the propensity score matching (PSM) technique to investigate the impact of OFDI 
on treated firms, each having an affiliate in Europe, by comparing them with a closely 
matched control group, selected from the subgroup of all the Chinese companies included 
in BvD Orbis with no investments abroad. Propensity score matching is then combined 
with difference-in-difference estimators to further eliminate time-invariant and 
unobservable differences between the treated and control firms.  
Our results confirm that OFDI does affect Chinese investing firms’ performance. We find a 
positive effect on firms’ efficiency and performance, which materialize at different points 
in time: while the productivity enhancement takes some time (Mansfield, 1985; Chen et al., 
2012), there is an immediate impact on company size, as indicated by increases in the 
number of employees. Total sales also show an upsurge as a result of the investment, 
showing the importance of market-seeking motives. Some interesting differences in the 
above results occur when we distinguish among investments on the basis of their entry 
mode, while taking into account the potential endogeneity of the choice. While both 
contribute to increases in productivity, acquisitions favour early access to intangible assets, 
but result in negative financial performance. On the other hand, it is via greenfield 
investments that Chinese firms are more likely to increase their size and sales. 
Our analysis has important implications, since it adds to the existing knowledge of Chinese 
OFDI, in that we shed light on the kinds of spillovers that result from asset-exploring 
strategies in the more advanced markets and on which modes of entry enable Chinese 
companies to gain competitive advantages.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature 
on the effects of OFDI on the investing firms’ performance. Section 3 presents the original 
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data used for the analysis and discusses the methodology. Results are discussed in Section 
4, and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.  The effect of Outward FDI on investor firms’ performance 
The nexus between OFDI and the investors’ performance has been mainly investigated in 
the context of advanced economies, and the results have not been clear-cut. Firms exploring 
foreign markets through FDI can expect high returns, but they come together with large 
costs related to complexity, coordination and resource trade offs (Bertrand and Capron, 
2014). The empirical literature on heterogeneous firms typically shows that MNEs enjoy a 
productivity advantage over other types of firms (Helpman et al., 2004), but the evidence 
on other dimensions of performance, including employment and profitability, is less 
straightforward. Several studies have shown that both horizontal and vertical OFDI 
generally have positive effects on productivity as well as on the size of domestic activities 
(Barba Navaretti et al., 2010; Desai et al., 2009), but the effects of vertical FDI on 
employment are not as obvious (Castellani and Barba Navaretti, 2004; Hijzen et al., 2011). 
On emerging and developing countries, the empirical evidence on the impact of OFDIs on 
the investing firms is more limited. In contrast to the traditional MNEs, firms from 
emerging economies invest abroad in order to gain new competitive advantages and 
strategic resources they do not possess (Ramamurti, 2012; Luo and Tung, 2007). In light of 
this, it is not uncommon for EMNEs to undertake OFDIs as a deliberate strategy to grow 
larger and increase the overall scale of their activities (Luo and Tung, 2007).  
Furthermore, both the motivation of the investments and their final destination have an 
important influence on performance. This is a relevant aspect for the purposes of this study, 
which focuses on the emerging economies’ OFDI into advanced economies, characterized 
by a prevalence of market- and strategic asset-seeking motivations (Amighini et al., 2013).  
In the case of market-seeking FDI, the resulting increase in the scope of operations of 
MNEs may stimulate the exploitation of economies of scale, at the level of both the parent 
company and the affiliate. This might happen as a consequence of sharing sunk costs, 
information, or learning by doing (Hijzen et al., 2011). In addition, economies of scale may 
significantly impact the performance of the parent company, which provides specialized 
services to the affiliates as well as intermediate goods, if the latter are involved in overseas 
production activities serving foreign markets. In this context, not only do MNEs increase 
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their overall size; they also combine domestic and foreign production to enhance their 
productivity and competitiveness in both the home and host country (Herzer, 2012; Desai et 
al., 2009).  
The effect is potentially stronger in the case of asset- or technology-seeking FDI, which are 
usually directed to advanced economies1, and are common for EMNEs. Foreign affiliates 
can be seen as a vehicle to acquire knowledge, technologies, know-how, and management 
capabilities, all assets that are then transferred back to the parent company in the form of 
reverse technology and knowledge transfers (Chen et al., 2012). It should be noted that in 
some circumstances the potential benefits of such investments might be offset because of a 
lack of international experience of EMNEs and a lack of knowledge of foreign markets, 
especially those with a larger cultural distance (Bertrand and Capron, 2014), as recently 
shown by Buckley et al. (2014).    
Among the few studies investigating the effects of OFDIs on the performance of EMNEs, 
some have looked specifically at the effect of asset-seeking motivation on the technological 
performance of investor firms (Chen et al., 2012; Pradhan and Singh, 2009). Only a few 
other studies focus on the effects of OFDIs on other aspects of firms’ performance in the 
context of emerging economies. Among them, a paper by Debaere et al. (2010) combines 
propensity score matching with difference-in-difference estimators to study the effect of 
FDI on employment growth in a group of Korean MNEs and shows significant reductions 
for firms investing in developing countries but non-significant effects for investments into 
advanced economies. Two other studies focus on Taiwan and show that foreign operations 
generally: a) promote an increase in domestic production and employment, conditional on 
the size of the investment (Liu and Nunnenkamp, 2011); and b) raise firms’ productivity, as 
they affect both technological endowments and the firms’ technical efficiency (Yang et al., 
2013).  
A recent work by Chen and Tang (2014) investigates the effect of OFDI on different 
dimensions of performance of Chinese firms. The paper is based on MOFCOM approved 
investments 2 and finds positive effects of OFDIs on productivity, employment and on 
various dimensions of export performance. With respect to this analysis, we focus here on                                                         1 Indeed, extant literature on MNEs has showed that the investment destination matters, with increases in productivity being associated with investments in higher technology intensive countries (de la Potterie and Lichenberg, 2001; Barba Navaretti et al., 2010). 2 As recognized by the same authors, MOFCOM data are biased towards financial centers, like Hong Kong, and in some cases this hides the real final destination of the investments (for a comparison of the database used in our empirical analysis versus MOFCOM data, see Amighini et al., 2014).  
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Chinese investments into advanced economies and we include information on the entry 
modes of the investments. As a matter of principle, efficiency gains and learning from FDI 
could be equally captured by means of both M&As and greenfield, though in practice it is 
more likely that the former entry mode contributes mainly to learning and knowledge 
transfer while the latter is more likely to enhance complementarities and the exploitation of 
existing resources (Bertrand and Capron, 2014).  
To our knowledge no studies have examined the effect of greenfield FDI on firms’ 
performance, at least in the context of EMNEs, while there are a few evaluating the impact 
of M&As. Using a sample of public listed firms, Edamura et al. (2014) have empirically 
shown the existence of a positive effect on sales, productivity, and assets of M&As for 
Chinese acquiring firms. But there is also evidence suggesting that EMNEs may lack the 
internal capability needed for completing well performing M&A deals (Nair et al., 2015). 
This is consistent with the findings of Bertrand and Bertschinger (2012) based on a sample 
of Russian MNEs, which look at the effects of acquisitions on profitability and find that a 
lack of international experience, together with the limited ownership advantages, have 
undermined the capacity to leverage values from foreign acquisitions. 
There is also some evidence from case studies on Chinese EMNEs confirming that the 
expected positive outcomes of M&As in advanced countries are often delayed or reduced 
because of a lack of experience and competitive advantages, especially in contexts 
characterized by wide cultural differences (Nolan, 2012; Spigarelli et al., 2013; Hansen et 
al., 2014). 
 
3.  Data and Methodology 
3.1. The database 
Our analysis is based on a novel database – the Emerging Multinationals’ Events and 
Networks DATAbase (EMENDATA) – which includes greenfield investments, mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A), and other minority investments (Amighini et al., 2014). 
EMENDATA matches different international data sources: fDiMarkets from the Financial 
Times Group providing information on greenfield investments; Zephyr from Bureau van 
Dijk (BvD) and SDC Platinum from Thomson Reuter offering information on M&A and 
other minority investments (corresponding to a share of less than 50% of ownership). 
EMENDATA covers all FDI from emerging multinationals (EMNEs) in Europe between 
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2003 and 2011. In addition, EMENDATA provides information on investor companies and 
their Global Ultimate Owners (GUO) from Orbis (BvD).  
For the specific purposes of this work, we look at all the deals undertaken by Chinese 
investor firms within the EU27. According to EMENDATA, the EU27 is the most 
attractive region for Chinese OFDI, followed by Asia (Amighini et al, 2014).3 The total 
number of Chinese companies with one or more investments in Europe is 521 (423 with 
one investment and 98 with more than one deal). The sample shrinks to 368 companies 
(70% of the initial sample) because of the limited availability of firm level information. The 
information has been extracted at the parent company level, consolidating all the deals of 
the same business group, even when undertaken through different subsidiaries.4  
As far as the main descriptive statistics are concerned, our data show that the list of 
destinations of the first investment in Europe is quite concentrated, as the top five locations 
(in order of relevance: Germany, UK, France, Netherlands and Italy) represent together the 
77.7% of the total. Sectorally, on the other hand, there is a larger diversification, with a 
slight prevalence of industrial machineries (15% of total projects) and electronics (12%), 
but it is not surprising to observe that all the main sectors of specialization of the different 
European markets have been targeted by Chinese investors.  
Distinguishing by entry mode, our data show that a large majority (more than three quarter) 
of Chinese OFDI are greenfield investments, the half of which is directed towards 
Germany. Also in the case of M&As the top 5 target countries are the same, although with 
a slightly different ranking (Netherlands more attractive than France) and less distance 
among them (M&As towards Germany are just a few more than to other top destinations). 
Other specificities appear when looking at sectors of investment: the industrial machinery 
sector is clearly the top one both for greenfield and M&As (with 14% and 19% on total, 
respectively); then investments are quite distributed across all other sectors, with textile and 
transports more attractive for M&As, while electronics and consumer products more for 
greenfield. Finally, two thirds of M&As are represented by acquisitions of 100% of 
company shares. 
3.2  The econometric methodology                                                         
3 This is the case where we exclude from Asia all the investments from Mainland China into Honk Kong; if 
these are included, Asia becomes the main destination for Chinese OFDI.  
4 In the whole sample, only 30 Chinese investor firms have undertaken cross-border deals through multiple companies within the same business group. This implies that for all investors the matching with BvD variables has been done via the consolidated balance sheets, except for firms that did not consolidate. 
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The empirical assessment of the impact of OFDI on the investor companies faces a major 
problem of endogeneity and reverse causality, widely recognized in the literature (Helpman 
et al., 2004). In fact, there is problem of self-selection because larger and more productive 
firms could be more likely to undertake foreign investments. In other words, the better 
performance of MNEs with respect to firms without foreign investments could be 
independent of their decision to undertake OFDI (Castellani and Barba Navaretti, 2004).  
The first step of our analysis is to assess the existence of structural differences between two 
groups of firms: the treated firms corresponding to those companies that have invested in 
the EU27 and the control group of companies without foreign investments. As far as the 
latter are concerned, from BvD Orbis we also included 4,801 Chinese companies that 
control at least one subsidiary in China but do not have any foreign subsidiaries, that is, 
companies that have not undertaken any OFDI before 2011. 
Table 1 presents their key characteristics in the year before the first investment. In order to 
assign counterfactual treatment dates to the firms included in the control group we follow 
the procedures described in Chari et al. (2012). More specifically, we adopt the approach of 
proportional random investment time assignment. We have first determined the number of 
investments that occur in each calendar year during our sample period and then assign the 
hypothetical treatment year to the companies in the control group in the same proportion as 
the investments occurred in the treated group. Thus, for instance, since about 12% of all 
investments occurred in 2006 in our sample of targets, then 12% all firms in the control 
group receive 2006 as the hypothetical treatment year. 
The choice of considering the first investment in the EU27 is motivated by the fact that the 
decision to internationalise in an advanced market and become a multinational represents a 
change of status for a company.5 In the empirical analysis we aim at investigating whether 
this decision has an impact on firms’ productivity and structural characteristics. 
Our data confirm that there are significant differences between the two considered groups: 
the treated companies are younger, larger, and more profitable than the companies in the 
control group. 
<Table 1 here> 
                                                        
5 In 63% of the greenfield and 82% of the M&As, the companies have not previously invested in any other 
country, Furthermore, in 78% of the greenfield and 95% of the M&As the companies have not carried out any 
other investments in other advanced countries (i.e. Australia, Canada, Japan, Switzerland and the US).  
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The second step of the analysis is to further investigate the existence of heterogeneity 
among the sample firms using a simple OLS regression to test the relationship between 
firms’ characteristics, performance indicators and a dummy variable (OFDI) taking the 
value of 1 in the year of the first investment and at the following years and 0 otherwise (i.e. 
if a firm has first invested in Europe in 2006, this variable takes the value of zero for the 
years 2003-2005 and 1 for 2006-2011)6. The model is:  
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑥𝑥,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑥𝑥,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗+𝛿𝛿𝑥𝑥+𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑥𝑥,𝑡𝑡      (1) 
where Y indicates firms’ characteristics and measures of productivity (see Appendix A for 
details) in firm i in province j, sector x and year t, and γj, δx, and ρt, are respectively 
province, industry (2 digit codes of the ISIC Rev. 3 classification), and year effects.  
Table 2 shows that the effects of the investments are positive and significant with respect to 
productivity, sales and employment, while there is a negative effect on financial 
performance, especially on the return on assets7. 
<Table 2 here> 
In the third step of the empirical analysis we follow a well-established strand of empirical 
literature (Castellani and Barba Navaretti, 2004; Debaere et al., 2010) and, using propensity 
score matching technique (PSM), we build a counterfactual by selecting a group of non-
investors whose characteristics closely match the Chinese investing companies. Therefore, 
the control group includes Chinese companies without any foreign affiliates but with the 
same ex-ante probability to undertake an OFDI.  
We then estimate the probability of investing in Europe as a function of observable 
characteristics by means of a Probit model:  
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 (𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 1|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1)         (2) 
Our vector of observable characteristics, X, includes a number of standard variables that 
can affect the probability of investing overseas (see Debaere et al., 2010; Chari et al., 2012;                                                         6 As suggested by Bertrand and Capron (2014), the construction of the OFDI variable in this way allows to take into account as well firms that make multiple investments. We also introduce specific robustness checks in section 4.2 to better account for these occurences. Still, there is a limitation in our approach, i.e. that in the treated group the variable OFDI takes the value of 0 even if the company has made an investment before 2003. This is due to the  lack of availability of information on firms deals in EMENDATA before that year. This notwithstanding, we are confident that this does not affect significantly our results since the larger wave of foreign investments from China started only by the second half of the 2000s.  7 Summary statistics and the correlation matrix for all the variables included in the different models are reported in Tables B1-B2 in the Appendix. 
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Chen and Tang, 2014), including age and age squared, as a proxy for the experience of the 
firm, size (measured by the number of employees), capital intensity, financial performance 
(measured by the return on assets)8, and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is listed on 
the stock exchange or 0 otherwise as a proxy for the capacity to access financial capital.9 
The specification also includes 2-digit industry dummies, to control for industry-specific 
performance and to take into account specific incentives and policies targeted to specific 
sectors; and provincial dummies based on the geographic distribution of firms within 
provinces and autonomous municipalities, to control for the heterogeneity of local policies 
which might affect the decision of the firms to invest. Finally, we also include year 
dummies to control for common shocks and business cycle fluctuations.  
The results for the Probit model, reported in Table B3 in the Appendix, show that larger 
firms, in terms of employment, those more capital intensive, as well as those with higher 
returns on assets are more likely to invest in Europe. Age appears to have a negative effect, 
as in Edamura et al (2014), which is explained by the high propensity of Chinese MNEs to 
undertake early internationalization strategies and thus leapfrog the traditional stages of 
development. However, the relation between age and the propensity to invest in advanced 
countries is non-linear, indicating that the most recently established firms have lower 
probabilities to go abroad.  
Propensity scores are then computed based on the output of the Probit analysis. We select 
those firms that are as similar as possible to the investing companies in terms of propensity 
scores, using the Kernel matching estimator with common support by means of the Leuven-
Sianesi (2003) algorithm.10  
Figure 1 provides an illustration of the matching procedure. The graph on the left shows the 
predicted probability, i.e. the propensity score, of investing abroad for the entire control 
group before matching vis-à-vis the treated firms, while the right graph presents the same 
                                                        8 For the variables representing firm structure, capital intensity and financial performance we use the average values for the last three years before the investment. Two main reasons for this: first we are able to increase the number of observations given the large number of missing values in our sample; second the decision to invest abroad might not necessarily be taken the year before investing (on this see Hijzen et al., 2011), especially when – as in the case of China – approval procedures take time. 9 The choice of the control variables for the probit model has been affected by the limitation of the data. It would have been of interest, for instance, to include other variables measuring the internationalization status of the companies, their R&D and additional information on their financial accounts. In addition, we could not add a variable to identifying State Owned Enterprises, given that this information is not directly available either in our database or in Orbis.  10 A total of 139 firms are included in the final group of the treated, while the firms in the control group are 1,096. Alternative matching algorithms, including the nearest neighbour and the Mahalanobis one, were also tested, but their performance was worse in terms of the balancing test.  
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probability for the groups of the matched controls and the treated, showing that the two 
distributions almost overlap after the matching procedure.  
<Figure 1 here> 
Another way to evaluate the results of the matching procedures is to test the so-called 
balancing hypothesis, which means that observations with the same score have the same 
distribution of observable characteristics independently of the treatment. This hypothesis is 
tested both before and after the matching. Table 3 shows that the two samples can be 
considered well-balanced given that the standardized percentage bias falls well below the 
standard 5% threshold, and that the t-tests on the selected variables are not significant 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). Furthermore, following Sianesi (2004), we compare the 
pseudo R2 before and after the matching finding a sensible reduction.11  
<Table 3 here> 
Finally, in the fourth step of our empirical analysis, we use the propensity scores to 
calculate a difference-in-difference (DID) estimator to further rule out time-invariant and 
unobservable differences between treated firms and the controls, using the following genral 
specification:  
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗+𝛿𝛿𝑥𝑥+𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖   (3) 
where firms in the control group are weighted on the basis the propensity score difference 
between treated and control firms, obtained via the matching procedure described earlier. 
The DID allows to compare the change in the average outcomes for the two groups of firms 
in our sample during a time period including the year before the investment took place (t= -
1) and a time period (t=n) following the investment. Given the availability of a relatively 
long time series, we are able to test the effects on performance from the year of the 
investment (t=0) up to five years after (t=5).  
 
4.  Results 
                                                        11 As the pseudo R2 is an indicator of how well the regressors explain the probability of selection, after matching, its value should decrease considerably compared to that prior to the procedures (Sianesi, 2004). 
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Table 4 provides the results of our difference-in-difference estimator including a number of 
indicators over a period covering from the year of the investment (t=0) up to five years (t= 
1,…,5) after it. 
<Table 4 here> 
Columns I-III present the effects of the investment on firms’ efficiency, showing that 
investments hardly induce a significant immediate increase in productivity. The sign of the 
coefficient (although still not significant) switches from positive at t=0 to negative for the 
following two years. The positive sign at t=0 can be considered a further indicator for the 
existence of a productivity premium for foreign investors, as already pointed out in the 
previous section. On the other hand, the switch to a negative sign from t=1 can be 
interpreted as an initial effect of the investment, which implies high costs linked to greater 
complexity and adaptation, this being especially true for firms from emerging economies, 
starting with a less developed set of resources and competitive advantages (Sanfilippo, 
2014; Nair et al., 2015). Then, after four years from the investment, Chinese firms investing 
in Europe experience a significant increase in their productivity, which is estimated at some 
20 to 58 percentage points higher than for non-treated firms, depending on the indicator 
used. There are two possible explanations for this positive and significant difference in 
productivity. It could be the result of reorganization of production activities, leading to a 
more efficient division of labour between parent and affiliates. Moreover, we can expect 
intra-firm transfer of knowledge, technologies and managerial best practices, which would 
provide evidence of learning and reverse spillovers. The latter mechanisms depend on the 
existence of a knowledge gap between the host and the home market, which is likely in the 
China-EU case, as well as on the existence of absorptive capacities and a domestic 
environment conducive to knowledge transfer (Bertand and Capron, 2014). As the latter 
may still be weak in the case of China, we show that productivity gains take on average 
four years to be absorbed by firms (Mansfield, 1985; Chen et al., 2012).  
Related to this, in Column IV, we control for intangible assets, as a proxy for the asset-
seeking motivation (Deng, 2009; Buckley et al., 2014). In fact, one of the reasons why 
EMNEs invest abroad, especially in advanced markets, is to complement their resources 
with new assets hardly available in the home country (Ramamurti, 2012). Nevertheless, we 
do not find any significant improvements relative to non-investors in the share of intangible 
over total assets, which actually show a small relative decrease in years three and four, 
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possibly due to more rapid accumulation of fixed assets, as recently shown by the industry 
level analysis conduced by You and Solomon (2015). 
Another key implication of OFDI is represented by the capacity to expand the overall scale 
of investors’ activities. Though such an investment itself represents an expansion of the 
investor’s scale, this can also be due to a number of different factors, including, for 
instance, the need to serve new markets or to extend and coordinate existing activities 
across borders. We test this hypothesis using two main variables.  
In Column V, we measure the impact of investments in Europe on the employment of 
Chinese EMNEs finding a positive and significant effect. This result is consistent with the 
existing evidence on the employment effect of OFDI in Chinese firms (Chen and Tang, 
2014) as well as in firms in other emerging economies, such as Korea (Debaere et al., 2010) 
and Taiwan (Liu and Nunnenkamp, 2011). In the case of China, this result does not come 
as a surprise. As the country is still in its process of building up its domestic capacities, it is 
very likely that efficiency seeking investments can be excluded and that OFDI is generally 
oriented to increasing the scale of the investor companies rather than substituting domestic 
employment with the establishment of foreign affiliates.  
In a similar vein, we find that investments lead to a significantly larger increase in total 
sales as compared to the control group (Column VI). Unfortunately, due to data limitations, 
we cannot determine whether exports, intra-company trade or domestic sales explain this 
increase. Consistently, based on the literature on the determinants of Chinese FDI (Buckley 
et al., 2007), we assume that such an increase could be explained by market seeking 
investments aimed at strengthening the market position in advanced countries through the 
establishment of trade offices and/or the acquisition of distribution networks. The 
importance of market seeking as motivation for investments is also confirmed by surveys 
undertaken on Chinese investors in Europe (European Chamber of Commerce, 2013). 
Moreover, Chinese investments in advanced economies are also aimed at responding to the 
increasing sophistication of domestic demand, as documented in the case of the investments 
of Haier, an Italian white goods company, by Pietrobelli et al (2011). This helps to explain 
the rise in domestic sales compared to national firms. Finally, in the case of production 
related vertical investments there could also be an increase in intra-firm trade (Barba 
Navaretti and Venables, 2004). 
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Finally, columns VII-VIII report the impact of the investments on certain financial 
indicators for investigating how the profitability of the investors is affected by OFDI. The 
results are always not significant, but the situation changes in the next section, where we 
take into account the different modes of entry of the investments - greenfield versus M&As 
– given the different financial efforts involved (Norback and Persson, 2002). 
 
4.1  Does the entry mode influence domestic performance?  
In this section, we replicate the empirical analysis presented in the previous section 
introducing a distinction between the two entry modes – greenfield and M&As – to explore 
whether there is any difference in their impact on investors. Treated and control samples 
have been selected following similar procedures as those described in Section 3.1. 
Methodologically, however, following the same approach would have hindered a potential 
bias in the following results due to endogeneity of the entry mode choice by the firms, 
considering that the decision to invest and the decision on the mode are not likely to be 
taken separately (Javorcik, 2004). To overcome such limitation, we estimate the decision 
regarding the entry mode of the investment project conditional on investment taking place 
using a sample selection model. More precisely, we first adopt a bivariate probit model 
with sample selection in which there are two dependent variables: OFDI taking the value of 
1 if the firm undertook an investment and 0 otherwise (as in equation 2), and OFDI_MA 
taking the value of 1 if the firm undertook a M&A and 0 if it opted for a greenfield 
investment: 
      (4) To estimate (4) we use the same set of characteristics affecting the choice of investing 
abroad (as in 2), with the exclusion of the years’ dummy, less likely to influence the entry 
mode12.  
                                                        12 An additional reason for this is that for the model to be correctly identified, the selection equation should have at least one variable that is not in the probit equation. We estimate the model in two steps, computing the inverse mill’s ratio after running the first probit model, and including its coefficient in the second equation. Due to the large number of dummies, which prevented convergence, we could not estimate the two equations simultaneously by means of the “heckprob” routine in STATA. For robustness, we have however run a restricted model, including only industry and provincial dummies, getting very similar results (such results, for comparison, are reported in column 2 of Table B3).  
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Results of the bivariate probit model are reported in Table B4, and are broadly in line with 
those reported in Table B3. Firms undertaking M&As are younger, smaller in size and less 
capital intensive compared to those involved in greenfield FDI. Interestingly, the effect of 
public listing on the probability to choose M&A is positive and significant. M&As usually 
require larger capital commitments, and public listed firms are more likely to have access to 
financial resources. This is even more likely in the case of China, where access to credit is 
considered a binding constraint to potential (non-listed) investors (Sutherland and Ning, 
2011).  
Once the selection model has been correctly specified, we apply similar procedures to those 
described in section 3.2 to retrieve propensity scores and weights, which are then used in 
the DID regressions.  
Tables 5 and 6 present the results of this analysis.  
<Table 5 here> 
<Table 6 here> 
Considering Columns I-III in the two tables, we notice that it is both through greenfield 
FDI and M&As that Chinese EMNEs can increase their productivity. This result provides 
new evidence with respect to the analysis presented in Edamura et al. (2014), which is only 
focused on M&As. Greenfield investments can result in early and higher gains in 
productivity compared to M&As, and this can be the results of stronger complementarities 
with foreign affiliates. On the one hand, strategic acquisitions are more likely to be 
undertaken by Chinese firms with the objective of getting access to resources, which are 
mainly oriented to increasing the value added of production rather than its efficiency. It is 
also true that – especially in more distant contexts such as the EU27 – M&As are more 
complex operations to manage than greenfield investments, and this can result in 
underperforming deals. Indeed, in some cases, the lack of prior international experience of 
many Chinese firms and their cultural distance from western companies cast doubts on their 
ability to successfully take advantage from foreign operations. This has been documented 
by case studies on several acquisitions made in Europe, showing the difficulty to obtain the 
expected gains through the production efficiency of the acquired company (Spigarelli et al., 
2013) as well as the obstacles encountered in the transfer of knowledge and technology 
from the target to the acquirer (Hansen et al., 2014).  
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With regard to employment and sales, there are significant and positive effects of 
greenfield investments, which can be much larger than those of domestic firms. Such a 
result does not come as a surprise considering that setting up a new affiliate necessarily 
involves a duplication of existing activities. But given that the vast majority of greenfield 
investments in Europe are of small size13, we would also expect that the large increase 
relative to domestic firms goes beyond the new activities created abroad and positively 
affects the sizes of investors. Taking into account sales, given that some greenfield 
investments in Europe consist of the establishment of market-oriented and trade-related 
activities, their rise can be considered a confirmation of the positive impact of 
internationalization strategies.  
Taking into account M&As (Table 6), the impact on size is also generally positive and 
significant, but it is smaller than in the case of greenfield investments. Given that M&As 
generally require higher cash flows and a more complex ex ante structure, firms investing 
via acquisitions are in general better established companies in their home country and this 
can explain this relatively more limited impact on scale. In addition, considering that 
existing analyses linking the motivation of the investment to the entry mode consistently 
show that M&As are mainly used by Chinese firms to gain access to strategic assets for 
upgrading their operations (Deng, 2009), while greenfield investments are used for 
expansion purposes (Quer et al., 2012), one could argue that acquisitions should contribute 
mainly (and earlier) to a qualitative, rather than quantitative, improvement of the firm. 
Indeed, considering intangible assets, we observe that Chinese firms increase their relative 
endowments as an immediate consequence of M&As in Europe, confirming a finding by 
Edamura et al. (2014) that it is mainly through acquisitions that Chinese firms tap into 
foreign technologies and knowledge for accelerating their upgrading (Deng, 2009). 
Finally, the indicators of financial profitability weaken steadily as a consequence of M&As. 
This result is consistent with the literature on the effects of M&As. On the one hand, in line 
with Norback and Persson (2002), we confirm that negative profitability is more likely to 
be caused by M&As, rather than greenfield investments. On the other hand, in accordance 
with the findings of Bertrand and Betschinger (2012) on M&As undertaken by Russian 
MNEs, we show that also Chinese MNEs (in most cases at their first foreign M&A) are 
unable to leverage value from their foreign acquisitions.                                                          13 According to our data, about 75% of affiliates established through greenfield investments in Europe has less than 50 employees.  
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4.2 Robustness checks 
A number of robustness checks have been run to confirm the overall validity of our main 
findings. First of all, we have verified that the results are robust to changes in the set of 
explanatory variables used in the probit model. This has been done either by replacing the 
control variables averaged for the last three years with their equivalents at time t and t-1, 
and by adding a larger set of controls, including assets, turnover, returns on efficiency 
(ROE)14. In both cases results of the probit model (Table B3, columns II-IV) and of the 
DID remains largely unchanged15, leaving us quite confident on their relevance and overall 
robustness.  
 
Moving to the results of the DID (Table 4), one could argue that other firm-specific 
characteristics can have an influence on the performance of the firms, together with OFDI. 
This is especially true for the estimates of productivity, considering the large literature 
pointing out that variables such as experience, size, the internationalization status and the 
innovative capacity have a strong influence on firms’ heterogeneous performance 
(Helpman et al., 2004). In order to address such potential concern, we also ran the DID 
model on the main measures of productivity reported in Columns I-III of Table 4, including 
age, size and capital intensity among the independent variables in the regressions. Results, 
summarized in Table B5 in the Appendix, are robust to the introduction of the additional 
controls. It is interesting to notice, however, that there is a reduction in the size of the effect 
of FDI on the different measures of productivity, which can indeed be attributed to the 
moderating effect of the covariates.  
4.2.1 Dealing with multiple treatments  
As remarked in section 3.2, the propensity score matching estimator has several advantages 
over standard procedures, and it allows to get more clarity about the direction of causality 
between OFDI and performance, while taking in due account the issues related to 
endogeneity. This approach is nonetheless not immune to criticism. One point of contention 
that may be quite relevant to our case is related to the issue of multiple treatments, i.e. the 
                                                        14 The introduction of these additional variables reduces the explanatory power of the model, and the balancing test run after the selection has a worst performance compared to our preferred specification. In addition, the introduction of total assets drops out the capital per employees due to collinearity.  15 Results of the DID are not included for reasons of space, but are available upon request to the authors.  
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presence of firms performing multiple investments over the period considered. This may 
introduce biases into our estimations. While, as suggested by Bertrand and Capron (2014), 
the way we constructed the treatment indicator (OFDI) allows to take into account firms 
that have invested in more than one year, one should not overlook the fact that the large 
size of the coefficients reported in Table 4 some years after the initial investment could be 
attributable to the effect of additional investments.  
As remarked in section 3.1, our sample is partially affected by such issue, considering that 
investors with more than one deal represent 18.8% of the initial sample of 521 firms, and 
raise up to about 26% of the usable sample of 368 investors.  
In what follows, we try to account for such potential bias in the results by adopting two 
different strategies. First, we ran our PSM-DID model on a sample of treated firms 
composed of individual investors only, i.e. excluding all firms that have undertaken more 
than one investment in the period considered. Table B6 in the Appendix shows that our 
concerns are not necessarily supported by the results since the relations examined remain 
significant. Interestingly, however, we notice that the size of the scale-related coefficients 
(employees and sales) tends to reduce as we move to later years. In such cases, this can be 
explained by the exclusion of multiple investors in the sample.  
Second, following the empirical strategy adopted by Bertrand and Betschinger (2012), we 
check the overall robustness of our approach by adopting an alternative estimator, based on 
a dynamic GMM. In order to account for the presence of multiple investors, we replace our 
OFDI dummy with a new variable (N_OFDI) counting the number of investments 
undertaken by each firm. In our settings, the GMM is a good alternative to the PSM 
approach, given that it allows to take into account the endogeneity of OFDI. Moreover, it 
also controls for the possibility of omitted variables. This enables us to overcome the 
potential limitations due the assumptions of conditional independence in PSM (Imbens and 
Wooldridge, 2009). Finally, adopting a dynamic panel approach has the additional 
advantage of controlling for persistence, i.e. the dependence of performance indicators on 
their past values. 
We control for factors affecting the performance of both investors and non-investors to 
isolate the effect of FDI using a system GMM approach (Roodman, 2009) to test the effects 
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of FDI on productivity.16  It is possible to infer from Table 7 that both the Hansen test of 
over-identification and the Arellano-Bond test of first- and second- order autocorrelation 
confirm the adequateness of the GMM specification adopted here. These results point once 
again to the positive relation between investment and productivity, proven by the positive 
and significant coefficient of the N_OFDI variable. Compared to previous results (e.g. 
Table 2) the coefficient of the FDI variable is higher since we explicitly account for the 
presence of multiple investors in the sample of treated firms. 
<Table 7 here> 
 
5.  Conclusions  
 
This paper has analysed the effects of OFDI into the EU-27countries on the performance of 
Chinese MNEs. Our results robustly show that Chinese OFDIs have so far affected 
different dimensions of MNEs performance. We find that Chinese investors register an 
increase in productivity and capital endowments, but these effects only materialize some 
years after the initial investment. In line with the existing literature on EMNEs, we also 
show that firms may speed up the process of gaining access to new resources and intangible 
assets via M&As, even if this seems to happen at the cost of a lower profitability. We show 
that M&As are not so frequently aimed at the quantitative growth per se, but rather at a 
qualitative improvement in the firm. Indeed, firms engaging in M&As are expected to be 
relatively larger ex ante but to grow more slowly after the acquisition, as their efforts 
concentrate on the assimilation of technological advantages. Conversely, Chinese firms 
undertaking internationalization via greenfield investments see larger complementarities 
between domestic and foreign activities, the former benefitting from significant increases in 
scale, sales and assets.  
Taken together, these results provide new evidence that the recent rise of Chinese 
investments, spurred by the Government’s strategy of promoting the internationalization of 
domestic firms, is leading to improved performance by the domestic sector. However, it is 
still difficult to say whether the improvements in performance can contribute to the 
upgrading of the productive structure of the country. We find only weak evidence that 
M&As are leading to the transfer of more valuable resources in the form of intangible                                                         16 This choice is justified by the presence of a number of standard control variables (size, capital intensity and age), whose inclusion in the models used to estimate other performance indicators such as size, sales and profitability could be hardly motivated.  
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assets to the parent companies making the investments, and this effect even disappears a 
few years after the deal is concluded. In addition, due to the lack of information on value 
added, we are unable to investigate whether the gains in productivity lead to any process or 
product upgrading.  
An implication of our work for the study of China’s upgrading is that Chinese MNEs are 
still in the process of learning from their internationalization process and, especially in the 
case of M&As, they are gaining experience by accessing geographic and culturally distant 
markets. On the basis of our results, we can reasonably affirm that the stock of accumulated 
experience in overseas investments is directly related to an increase in the size of the gains 
accruing to domestic firms. This can be interpreted as an encouraging sign for Chinese 
investors, whose relative inexperience and lack of key competitive advantages have so far 
constrained their capacity to fully exploit the potential of overseas activities, as well as for 
the Chinese economy as a whole, which could well expect large returns from its increasing 
OFDI activities.  
This study has some limitations, which needs to be addressed in future research. The main 
one has to do with the availability of balance sheet information for Chinese firms. Not only 
this information is missing for a number of firms in our sample. For firms for which it is 
available, we have found many missing information, thing that did not allow us to explore 
some important dimensions, such as exports and innovation, or that forced us to rely on 
proxies for many indicators, such as TFP, due to the lack of information on value added 
and intermediate inputs, among the others. Accessing new sources of firm level information 
will make possible to provide a more comprehensive evaluation on whether and through 
which mechanisms Chinese firms upgrade through OFDI.  
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Figures 
Figure 1. Distribution of propensity scores before (left panel) and after (right panel) 
matching 
 





Table 1. Structural characteristics of sample firms (year before investment) 
 
Treated # Control # t-stat 
Year of establishment 1997 212 1995 1868 -2.5136* 
Employees (#) 23097.4 134 2202.96 1295 -10.2274** 
Total assets (USD million) 29,300 152 749 1395 -7.8857** 
Sales (USD million) 1530 140 234 1384 -6.8162** 
Turnover (USD million) 2350 150 251 1394 -9.8151** 
Profit margin (%) 12.711 138 8.084 1250 -2.9728** 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on EMENDATA and Bvd Orbis 
**p<0.01 , *p<0.05 
 
Table 2. Determinants of firms’ performance 
 (I) (II) (III) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) 
 LAB 
PROD 
TFP TFP_GMM SALES EMP PROF ROA 
OFDI 0.160*** 0.129*** 0.0242 1.501*** 1.428*** -0.00871 -0.663* 
 (0.0497) (0.0405) (0.0356) (0.0895) (0.0782) (0.00597) (0.372) 
Constant 11.15*** 7.325*** 8.006*** 18.64*** 7.583*** 0.0349** 2.641** 
 (0.116) (0.0828) (0.0559) (0.103) (0.144) (0.0153) (1.198) 
Province effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 11,982 11,982 11,975 13,422 12,200 12,589 12,821 
R2 0.200 0.165 0.941 0.212 0.229 0.131 0.064 
 
Table 3. Balancing test, before and after matching 
 
Unmatched Mean %reduct t-test 
Variable Matched Treated Control %bias |bias| t    p>t p>|t| 
        AGE Unmatched 2.1409 2.3528 -27.8 81.9 -12.50 0.000 
 
Matched 2.12 2.0808 5 0.43 0.669 
     
 
  AGE2 Unmatched 5.3061 6.0581 -21.4 78.9 -9.39 0.000 
 
Matched 5.0265 4.8679 4.5 0.39 0.697 
     
 
  EMPL Unmatched 7.3231 6.7263 30 63.9 13.35 0.000 
 
Matched 7.0673 6.8521 10.8 0.88 0.378 
     
 
  K_E Unmatched 11.718 11.547 11.7 36.2 4.81 0.000 
 
Matched 11.699 11.589 7.5 0.58 0.563 




ROA Unmatched 7.8838 5.9605 19.6 97.1 7.06 0.000 
 
Matched 8.0526 7.9969 0.6 0.05 0.963 
     
 
  PUBLIC Unmatched 0.49861 0.56104 -12.5 66.4 -5.52 0.000 
 
Matched 0.58594 0.56499 4.2 0.34 
  
Sample Pseudo R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 Mean bias Median bias 
Raw 0.183 1382.49 0.000 8.3 6.3 
Matched 0.022 7.76 1.000 2 0.5 
 
 
Table 4. Propensity score matching difference-in-difference estimator 
 
 (I) (II) (III) 
t LAB PROD N TFP N TFP_GMM N 
0 0.0468 2,122 0.0748 2,122 0.0793 2,122 
1 -0.0328 1,991 -0.00888 1,991 -0.0397 1,991 
2 -0.0324 1,707 -0.0261 1,707 -0.127 1,707 
3 0.154 1,506 0.15 1,506 0.0642 1,506 
4 0.379** 1,349 0.307** 1,349 0.201* 1,349 
5 0.582** 1,259 0.469*** 1,259 0.292** 1,259 
 
 (IV) (V) (VI) 
t INT/TOT N EMP N SALES N 
0 0.00498 1,410 0.549*** 2,155 0.429*** 2,233 
1 1.31E-05 1,393 0.714*** 2,024 0.607*** 2,082 
2 -0.00157 1,208 1.094*** 1,735 0.962*** 1,816 
3 -0.0103* 1,071 0.901*** 1,533 0.875*** 1,599 
4 -0.0183** 952 0.853*** 1,373 1.025*** 1,414 
5 -0.0126 858 1.019*** 1,282 1.600*** 1,272 
 
 (VII) (VIII) 
t PROF N ROA N 
0 -0.00921 1,995 -0.0623 2,033 
1 -0.0295 1,862 -1.025 1,903 
2 0.00114 1,605 -0.226 1,646 
3 -0.0167 1,418 -0.182 1,452 
4 -0.0212 1,285 0.0379 1,312 
5 -0.00574 1,156 -0.147 1,185 
Note: This table reports difference-in-difference estimates for the post-investment performance 
between treated and control firms on different outcomes. All equations include province, sector and 
years fixed effects. t={0,5} denotes the post-investment year.  
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Robust standard errors in parentheses;  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 5. Results for propensity score matching difference-in-difference estimator 
(Greenfield) 
 (I) (II) (III) 
t LAB PROD N TFP N TFP_GMM N 
0 0.329* 1,615 0.234 1,615 0.0792 1,615 
1 0.148 1,601 0.0595 1,601 -0.144 1,601 
2 0.0784 1,466 0.0204 1,466 -0.126 1,466 
3 0.201 1,293 0.0941 1,293 -0.0955 1,293 
4 0.572** 1,160 0.441** 1,160 0.183 1,160 
5 0.507** 1,060 0.384** 1,060 0.153 1,060 
 
 (IV) (V) (VI) 
t INT/TOT N EMP N SALES N 
0 -0.0125 1,134 0.352 1,643 0.487* 1,742 
1 0.00226 1,168 0.609** 1,628 0.709** 1,704 
2 -0.0167 1,056 0.383 1,493 0.369 1,561 
3 -0.0151 923 0.839** 1,318 1.008** 1,376 
4 -0.0148 825 1.205*** 1,181 1.776*** 1,234 
5 -0.0208 750 1.053** 1,080 1.560*** 1,113 
 
 (VII) (VIII) 
t PROF N ROA N 
0 -0.0081 1,563 -2.982 1,593 
1 0.0166 1,532 -2.508 1,562 
2 0.0285 1,414 -5.788 1,439 
3 0.0563** 1,246 -1.568 1,272 
4 0.00958 1,119 -3.407 1,133 
5 0.0625 995 0.587 1,011 
Note: This table documents difference-in-difference estimates for the post-investment performance 
between treated and control firms on a different set of outcomes. All equations include province, 
sector and years fixed effects. t={0,5} denotes the post-investment year.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses;  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 6. Results for propensity score matching difference-in-difference estimator (M&As) 
 (I) (II) (III) 
t LAB PROD N TFP N TFP_GMM N 
0 -0.0233 1,558 -0.0155 1,558 -0.048 1,558 
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1 0.16 1,542 0.129 1,542 0.0749 1,542 
2 0.0982 1,416 0.0477 1,416 -0.0222 1,416 
3 0.0779 1,284 0.0591 1,284 0.0942 1,284 
4 0.341* 1,178 0.261* 1,178 0.272** 1,178 
5 0.223 1,052 0.237 1,052 0.315* 1,052 
 
 (IV) (V) (VI) 
t INT/TOT N EMP N SALES N 
0 0.0215* 1,134 0.615** 1,576 0.684* 1,703 
1 0.0157* 1,183 0.702** 1,558 0.673** 1,634 
2 0.0049 1,020 0.678** 1,430 0.817*** 1,506 
3 -0.00562 938 0.517* 1,299 0.632* 1,400 
4 0.00694 861 0.258 1,191 0.649* 1,261 
5 -0.0102 752 -0.233 1,065 0.203 1,108 
 
 (VI) (VII) 
t PROF N ROA N 
0 -0.0476** 1,538 -1.844 1,568 
1 -0.0894*** 1,470 -2.493* 1,498 
2 -0.0780** 1,333 -2.858* 1,355 
3 -0.0243 1,254 -1.711 1,279 
4 -0.0651* 1,138 -1.229 1,153 
5 -0.0407 972 -1.422 987 
Note: This table reports difference-in-difference estimates for post-investment performance between 
treated and control firms on a different set of outcomes. All equations include province, sector and 
years fixed effects. t={0,5} denotes the post-investment year.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses;  




Table 7. System GMM Estimator 
 (I) (II) (III) 
 Lab prod TFP TFP_GMM 
    
L1. 0.4478*** 0.5493*** 0.5688*** 
 [0.045] [0.042] [0.043] 
N_OFDI 0.1901*** 0.1549*** 0.0841** 
 [0.037] [0.033] [0.042] 
AGE -0.0196 -0.0162 -0.0313 
 [0.016] [0.014] [0.107] 
EMPL -0.1046*** -0.0816*** -0.0368** 
 [0.022] [0.021] [0.018] 
K/E 0.3632*** 0.1392*** -0.1421** 
 [0.030] [0.017] [0.069] 
Constant 2.8787*** 2.4034*** 5.5438*** 
 [0.430] [0.387] [1.161] 
    
Province effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,705 9,705 9,701 
N. of panels 2,071 2,071 2,069 
Hansen 0.100 0.144 0.0439 
AR2 0.229 0.346 0.512 
Robust standard errors in parentheses;  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: This table reports the results of the System GMM estimator on the full sample of controls and 
treated firms on different measures of productivity. The variable L1 is the first lag of the dependent 
variable; N_OFDI is the number of investments for firms-years; AGE is the log of a firm’s age; 
EMPL is the log of the number of employees; K/E is the capital labour ratio. In each model, only 
variables L1, OFDI and N_OFDI are treated as endogenous and instrumented by the other 






The following indicators of productivity are used in the empirical analysis.  
1) A standard indicator of firms’ efficiency in terms of labour productivity, measured by 
the ratio between sales and number of employees (LAB PROD).  
2) An indicator of total factor productivity (TFP):  
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾                    (1) 
in which Ait is the Hicks-neutral efficiency level that represents the TFP of firms. Total 
sales is used as a proxy for output (Y), while the number of employees is used as the labour 
component (L) and total assets 17 to measure capital (K). All the variables reported in 
monetary terms are deflated by their respective industry price indexes. We calculate TFP 
with a constant return to scale Cobb-Douglas production function, assuming a conventional  
share of 2/3 for the labour component and 1/3 for capital (for a discussion on this, see 
Hulten and Isaksson, 2007). 
The lack of a number of sufficient observations to proxy intermediate inputs does not allow 
us to calculate more robust semi-parametric estimators using proxies to correct for the 
unobservable productivity shocks and input levels, such as the Olley-Pakes or Levinshon-
Petrin methods (Petrin et al., 2004). Therefore, we also estimate TFP (1) using the GMM 
approach (TFP_GMM) (Arellano and Bond, 1991), albeit with full awareness of concerns 
raised in the existing literature concerning these methodologies (Van Beveren, 2012).  
  
                                                        17 Total assets are used instead of fixed assets, given the presence of firms operating in the service sector, where intangibles are usually relevant. 
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Appendix B 
Table B1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LAB_PROD 11991 11.2401 1.1719 3.2050 20.2823 
TFP 11991 7.3224 0.9301 -0.4101 13.8726 
prod_GMM 11984 2.0879 3.1555 -16.3051 23.9412 
K/L 12172 11.7933 1.2678 7.0540 20.4665 
TOT_ASSETS 13656 18.7257 1.8320 8.7566 28.3503 
INTANGIBLES 10232 0.0503 0.0685 -0.0013 0.8396 
EMPL 12209 6.9931 1.6071 0 13.1010 
SALES 13431 18.1672 1.7816 7.2226 26.3514 
ROA 12830 5.6443 10.7362 -97.9000 97.2200 
PROFIT 12598 0.0879 0.1707 -0.9972 1 
AGE 19417 2.3369 0.7233 0 5.0106 
PUBLIC 20586 0.5545 0.4970 0 1 
 
Table B2. Correlation Matrix 
 
LAB_PROD TFP prod_GMM K/L TOT_ASSETS INTANG EMPL SALES ROA PROFIT AGE PUBLIC 
B_PROD 1 
           
 0.9605 1 
          
_GMM 0.1206 0.1854 1 
         
 0.7782 0.5726 -0.0633 1 
        
_ASSETS 0.3368 0.2777 0.0283 0.3655 1 
       
ANGIBLES -0.1454 -0.1456 -0.0298 -0.0998 -0.0809 1 
      
PL -0.2963 -0.1893 0.0776 -0.4455 0.6705 0.0017 1 
     
ES 0.4537 0.5246 0.1604 0.1525 0.8716 -0.1046 0.7167 1 
    
A 0.1089 0.1557 0.0841 -0.0307 -0.065 -0.018 -0.0381 0.044 1 
   
FIT 0.0688 0.0176 -0.0079 0.163 0.0331 -0.0118 -0.0981 -0.0413 0.7363 1 
  
E 0.0492 0.029 -0.0496 0.0794 0.1083 0.053 0.0409 0.0741 -0.1164 -0.0674 1 
 
LIC -0.0331 -0.0764 -0.0767 0.0748 0.2102 0.065 0.1426 0.1088 -0.0172 0.0556 0.0742  
 
 
Table B3. Results, probit estimator 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
AGE -1.361*** -1.296*** -2.101*** -1.359*** 
 (0.288) (0.308) (0.402) (0.288) 
AGE2 .199*** 0.200*** 0.345*** 0.198*** 
 (.0617) (0.0672) (0.0811) (0.0618) 
EMPL .126*** 0.187*** 0.0959** 0.0435 
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 (.0399) (0.0432) (0.0456) (0.0606) 
K/L .082 0.110* -0.00809  
 (.05344) (0.0602) (0.0664)  
ROA .0134** 0.0134** 0.0124* 0.0144* 
 (.0061) (0.00646) (0.00633) (0.00773) 
PUBLIC -.062 -0.0275 -0.0199 -0.0646 
 (.1319) (0.152) (0.156) (0.133) 
ASSETS    0.0834 
    (0.0786) 
TURNOVER    -0.00233 
    (0.0792) 
ROE    -0.000688 
    (0.00192) 
Province effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -6.332*** -6.013 -2.678 -5.129 
Observations 1,235 1,049 957 1,213 
Pseudo R2 .2005 .2145 .2105 .1967 
Standard errors in parentheses     





Table B3. Results, bivariate probit model with sample selection 
 (I) (II) 
 OFDI_MA OFDI_MA 
   
AGE 0.956*** 0.360** 
 (0.365) (0.160) 
AGE^2 -0.101 -0.0511 
 (0.0744) (0.0367) 
EMPL -0.408*** -0.111*** 
 (0.0893) (0.0254) 
K_E -0.374*** -0.0793** 
 (0.0990) (0.0319) 
ROA 0.00476 -0.0231*** 
 (0.0139) (0.00521) 
PUBLIC 3.224*** 1.179*** 
 (0.402) (0.151) 
Constant 1.871 1.058 
 (165.1) (0.647) 
Observations 814 1,095 
LR test (p-value)  14.89 (0.0000) 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: OFDI_MA, the dependent variable of the latent model, takes the value of 1 if the firm 
undertook a M&A, and 0 if it undertook a greenfield FDI. Column I includes results obtained using 
the two stages Heckman selection model. Column II reports estimates of the two equations run 
simultaneously. The selection model in column I does not include year dummies, while no dummies 
are included in the model reported in column II.  
 




PROD N TFP N TFP_GMM N 
0 0.0949 2,122 0.0949 2,122 0.108* 2,122 
1 -0.0211 1,991 -0.0211 1,991 -0.0277 1,991 
2 -0.0342 1,707 -0.0342 1,707 -0.0648 1,707 
3 0.114 1,506 0.114 1,506 0.0906 1,506 
4 0.229** 1,349 0.229** 1,349 0.247** 1,349 
5 0.362*** 1,259 0.362*** 1,259 0.372*** 1,259 
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Note: This table reports difference-in-difference estimates for the post-investment performance 
between treated and control firms on a different set of outcomes. All equations include capital 
labour ratio (K/L), the log of firms’ age and the log of firms’ employees as additional controls, 
together with province, sector and years fixed effects.  t={0,5} denotes the post-investment year.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses;  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table B5. Results, propensity score matching difference-in-difference estimator – 
Individual investors only  
t Lab_prod N TFP N prod_GMM N 
0 0.109 1,696 0.142* 1,696 0.127 1,696 
1 0.0423 1,652 0.0393 1,652 -0.0307 1,652 
2 0.0574 1,458 0.0182 1,458 -0.0794 1,458 
3 0.0562 1,286 0.0379 1,286 0.00317 1,286 
4 0.312** 1,149 0.223* 1,149 0.139 1,149 





assets N Employees N Sales N 
0 0.00345 1,189 0.493*** 1,720 0.484*** 1,834 
1 0.00242 1,206 0.639*** 1,677 0.679*** 1,761 
2 -0.000566 1,045 0.898*** 1,479 0.774*** 1,554 
3 -0.0122 920 0.657*** 1,310 0.524* 1,359 
4 -0.0061 813 0.736** 1,168 0.726** 1,211 
5 -0.0152 738 0.709* 1,069 0.649** 1,099 
 
t Profit N ROA N 
0 0.00224 1,617 -0.358 1,650 
1 -0.0206 1,570 -0.436 1,608 
2 0.00679 1,400 -2.156 1,425 
3 -0.00618 1,214 -1.177 1,241 
4 0.00353 1,084 1.103 1,104 
5 -0.00498 971 1.244 989 
Note: This table reports difference-in-difference estimates for the post-investment performance 
between treated and control firms on a different set of outcomes. All equations include province, 
sector and years fixed effects. t={0,5} denotes the post-investment year.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses;  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
